

## The Costliest Choice: Economic Impact of Youth Incarceration

We could send [youth] to Harvard for [what we pay for incarceration], and we don't get very good outcomes.

– Gladys Carrion, former director, New York State Office of Children and Family Services<sup>1</sup>

**\$187,765 per youth, per year**

– FY19 per capita annualized cost of Illinois youth prison operation and maintenance – *not including* education, treatment, or post-release supervision<sup>2</sup>

### Youth Incarceration Is shockingly expensive – especially given Illinois' budget crisis.

Illinois' use of five state prisons to incarcerate about 425 youth carries a direct operational cost – not including education, services, or aftercare – of about \$514 per youth, per day.<sup>3</sup> While this is high, it is not unheard of; few state-level policy choices are more expensive per capita than youth incarceration.<sup>4</sup> Illinois spends most of its juvenile justice funding to incarcerate youth in prisons.<sup>5</sup>

Since 2006 when the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (IDJJ) was created, the State of Illinois has budgeted \$1.5

billion directly to the agency (see chart, next page). After including a conservative estimate of 40% (\$600 million) of related budget items apportioned to other agencies (i.e., employee benefits and administrative costs),<sup>6</sup> over \$2 billion has been spent to incarcerate youth since IDJJ's founding.

While IDJJ's budget has remained relatively stable, per capita costs have soared. The proposed FY19 budget is 2.6% larger than when the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice was created, while youth population has declined by 72%.

### In part, rising per capita costs are a sign of progress.

The statewide drop in crimes committed by youth and an increase in counties using Redeploy Illinois and other means to divert youth from prison have resulted in a substantial increase in the state's per capita prison costs. Moreover, IDJJ's current standard of care is significantly elevated compared to the time of its founding. As discussed previously in this series,<sup>7</sup> staff-to-youth ratios are more

### Inside this Issue:

- ❖ In Illinois, state tax dollars devoted to juvenile justice are primarily spent to incarcerate - not rehabilitate - young people.
- ❖ Illinois has spent over \$2 billion on youth incarceration since IDJJ was founded in 2006. Although services have improved, the agency still struggles to provide youth in prison with needed education and services.
- ❖ Before spending a single dollar on education, mental health care, or substance abuse treatment for youth in prison, Illinois annually devotes \$187,765 per youth to operate its five youth prisons.
- ❖ Community-based alternatives to prisons are more effective at reducing crime and recidivism than incarceration, while creating fewer long-term social costs – even when used for the highest-risk youth.
- ❖ Illinois should invest in strengthening Illinois youth, families, and communities, restoring needed services damaged by the state budget crisis.

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
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appropriate;<sup>8</sup> staff are better-educated and better-trained; IDJJ has assumed parole/aftercare supervision and other responsibilities (and their associated fiscal impact) from IDOC; IDJJ is providing community-based services where none were available before;<sup>9</sup> youth in prison are provided with better access to services; and currently-incarcerated youth may also require more resources on average than in times past, as youth with fewer needs have been diverted to alternatives to incarceration.

Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice General Revenue Fund Appropriations <sup>10</sup>	
FY2019 (proposed)	\$120 million
FY2018	\$125 million
FY2017	\$134 million
FY2016	\$118 million
FY2015	\$121 million
FY2014	\$119 million
FY2013	\$116 million
FY2012	\$124 million
FY2011	\$124 million
FY2010	\$118 million
FY2009	\$129 million
FY2008	\$126 million
FY2007	\$117 million

However, it is still the case that the bulk of IDJJ’s budget is spent on basic prison operations. **Large institutions focused on incapacitation-centric, layered security are extraordinarily expensive, consuming resources needed for rehabilitative services.** Crumbling youth prison architecture in Illinois is in dangerous disrepair, not to mention inefficient and demoralizing. Staffing is heavily weighted toward tiers of security personnel who focus their attention on doors, cameras, youth movement, and rule infractions, scanning for potential threats. **Before a single youth receives a single hour of education, health care, therapy, programming, or services, the costs driven by the prison**

**setting itself are astronomical – about \$187,765 per youth, per year.**



*Youth prison settings shift juvenile justice resources toward incapacitation and away from rehabilitative services: IDJJ employs 10.5 guards for every 1 teacher.<sup>11</sup>*

A federal consent decree resulting from unconstitutional conditions litigation significantly increased spending on services for youth in prison; still, state funds budgeted for mental health and substance abuse treatment for youth at IDJJ make up less than 7% of spending on youth in prison.<sup>12</sup>

One way in which Illinois is unique is the consequences of its recent years of its record-breaking budget impasse.<sup>13</sup> **As the state has wavered between no-pay, low-pay, and slow-pay methods of compensating social service providers, community-based services to youth have suffered. Youth crisis services, including support for homeless youth, have been hit particularly hard.**<sup>14</sup> Even Illinois’ popular landmark alternative to incarceration program, Redeploy Illinois, was not spared; as more than half of participating counties were forced to halt admissions or cease operations, headlines like “For Some Illinois Kids, Budget Battle Means Going to Prison Instead of Home” made the damage crystal-clear long before it ended.<sup>15</sup> At the same time that more effective services

were shuttered, conditions worsened inside. As a result of Illinois' budget crisis, reports of inadequate maintenance, heat, and fresh food at youth prisons mounted, due to canceled vendor contracts and unpaid bills.<sup>16</sup> Passage of a state budget resolved the most urgent issues. However, it remains noteworthy that Illinois spent over \$100 million on a system of youth imprisonment – yet still struggled to keep youth warm and fed, much less safe, educated, or rehabilitated.

### **Direct youth prison costs are a tiny part of their total economic burden.**

While direct youth incarceration costs are very high, they are only a small fraction of the total economic impact of this policy choice.<sup>17</sup> Historically, the total social cost of incarceration has been understudied, especially compared to research regarding the economic impact of crime, and it is infrequently considered by stakeholders and decision-makers.

In 1999, researchers at the National Bureau of Economic Research demonstrated that incarcerating young people in high concentrations is associated with reduced neighborhood opportunity, earnings, and employment, affecting the economic well-being of the entire community.<sup>18</sup>

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The direct costs paid for confinement per day, or per year, are just the tip of the iceberg of what young people, their families, their communities, and all of us pay for these policy choices. Youth confinement imposes heavy burdens on family members..., exposes our communities to higher rates of recidivism, and impedes young people's transition to adulthood.<sup>19</sup>

– **Justice Policy Institute, Sticker Shock: Calculating the Full Price Tag for Youth Incarceration**

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More recently, researchers at Washington University in St. Louis calculated the economic cost of various social outcomes as well as incarceration's known effects on

individuals, their families, and communities.<sup>20</sup> They identified otherwise-hidden costs including lower educational attainment and economic output, visitation expenses, interrupted family relationships, increased risk of criminality, increased risks to children, homelessness, evictions and lower property values, and poorer health outcomes including premature death and infant mortality.<sup>21</sup> The researchers estimated that incarceration in the United States creates an aggregate annual burden of \$1 trillion – eleven times direct spending on incarceration: **“more than 90% of the costs of incarceration do not appear on government budgets and are absent from policy discussions.”**<sup>22</sup>

The ten-to-one estimate of incarceration's societal-versus-direct cost does not include youth incarceration, but there is reason to believe these effects are even more exaggerated for young people. Youth are imprisoned during a pivotal developmental phase, which may increase the negative effects of incarceration, and youth have more years of potential economic impact post-incarceration than adults.<sup>23</sup> Increased recidivism due to imprisonment also has a significant economic impact; some have estimated the benefit of avoiding future criminality by a single high-risk 14-year-old to be between \$2.6-\$5.3 million.<sup>24</sup>

The cumulative economic impact of lost and diminished opportunities is not limited to youth in prison, of course. A federally-commissioned estimate calculated \$4.7 trillion in lost long-term economic potential of youth due to disconnection from school and work for a variety of reasons, including involvement in the juvenile and criminal court systems.<sup>25</sup>

But due to prison's outsized impact on economic factors like youth education and earnings, the results for formerly-incarcerated youth are particularly stark.<sup>26</sup> Youth who have been incarcerated or detained struggle to find employment, which, along with education, is a necessary building block of successfully stable adult life.<sup>27</sup> The direct link between high school graduation and brighter employment prospects<sup>28</sup> means that youth sentenced to

**\$1**  
**Budgeted for Incarceration**  
(\$0.70 to corrections agency  
\$0.30 to other state agencies)



**\$10**  
**Hidden Economic Costs**  
**More Victimization**  
**More Reincarceration**  
**Less Community Safety**  
**Reduced Youth Earnings**  
**Reduced Tax Revenue**  
**Reduced Child Support**  
**Higher Medicaid Costs**  
**Higher Public Aid Costs**  
**More Family Debt**  
**Reduced Property Values**  
**Reduced Economic Output**



*Youth prison expenses, spread across several state agency budgets, incur as many as ten dollars of hidden costs to youth, families, communities, and other taxpayers for every dollar of “above the line” state expenditures.<sup>29</sup>*

incarceration in Illinois are immediately placed at a disadvantage when finding a job, because they are less likely to graduate from high school than if they were sentenced to community-based probation and services. In addition to the toll that incarceration takes on a youth’s well-being, it carries a stigma that can deter potential employers, and in Illinois, potential employers frequently become aware of the youth’s juvenile record.<sup>30</sup>

In short, there are many reasons to believe that the hidden economic burden of youth incarceration in Illinois is significantly higher than the recent adult estimate of \$10 in social cost for every one dollar spent on corrections. However, even if youth economic outcomes are estimated at the same level as adults’, the impact is staggering. **The choice to incarcerate youth likely creates an economic burden to Illinoisans of at least \$1.2 billion per year.<sup>31</sup>**

### **Better results are possible and affordable – but not free.**

Better outcomes for youth do require up-front investment, but they are more cost-


effective, and often inexpensive in the short-term. Despite these efficiencies, it is important to keep in mind that sustained public investment in communities outside of justice system programming is also necessary to repair, increase, and equalize the availability of community resources that strengthen youth and families.

### **Justice spending realignment programs like Redeploy Illinois work better – and help to build local infrastructure for alternatives to incarceration.**

In addition to Illinois, several states (Alabama, California, Georgia, Ohio, New York, and Texas) have used fiscal incentives to support less costly, more effective options to keep young people out of state confinement. In each case, the state has significantly reduced the number of youth in prison without a negative impact on public safety.<sup>32</sup> While the programs are effective, it is also notable that rather than spending money on operating and repairing large-scale youth prison infrastructure, they redirect state funds to counties, cities, courts, and community-based organizations. **Over time, this shift builds local capacity to keep more youth close to home; Ohio,<sup>33</sup>**



**New York,<sup>34</sup> and Texas<sup>35</sup> have documented the impact these funding streams have had on reducing the number of young people confined or placed out of their home.**



Illinois desperately needs youth justice reinvestment (both through Redeploy Illinois and outside of it), to build back and expand the capacity of local nonprofits who contract to provide state social services to youth and families. Investment is also needed to repair broader social infrastructure following significant budget-related damage.


**Alternatives to youth incarceration save money up front and long term through safety benefits.**

Most evidence-based youth services with high return on investment (ROI), such as family therapy (see previous report),<sup>36</sup> rely on youth to be at home or in a community setting to participate. Such services overwhelmingly cost far less upfront, as well as delivering long-term cost savings through improved outcomes. A study of RECLAIM Ohio, an incentive-realignment program similar to Redeploy Illinois, showed that youth diverted from incarceration into community-based supervision and services had lower rates of recidivism within every risk category.<sup>37</sup> Low- and medium-risk youth engaged in alternative settings had recidivism rates two-to-six times lower than incarcerated youth of the same risk levels.<sup>38</sup> Meanwhile, community-based alternatives to incarceration cost exponentially less than

youth prisons.<sup>39</sup>

Placing most youth in alternative programs is a cost-effective choice – these programs achieve much better results at a tiny fraction of the cost of youth prison for low- and medium-risk youth. But what of very high-risk youth, who may *not* have exponentially better outcomes in a community program than they would if sent to IDJJ?

It should still be a public safety priority to choose non-prison-based programs in every possible case, for three reasons: First, as illustrated through the experience of RECLAIM Ohio, **community-based programming can in fact deliver better recidivism results than the state youth prison system – even for youth in the highest (“very high risk”) category.** And once total program costs (initial processing plus recidivism differences) are considered, RECLAIM Ohio was significantly more cost-effective than both large state youth prisons and smaller, community correction facilities for youth in every risk category – including, again, the highest-risk youth.



Evaluation of Ohio’s Reclaim Funded Programs, Community Correctional Facilities, and DYS Facilities (Lowencamp & Latessa 2005)

RECLAIM = Alternatives to incarceration  
CCF = Community corrections facility (16-50 beds)  
DYS = State youth prisons (100+ beds)

Second, **if alternatives to incarceration like Redeploy Illinois are expanded to very high-risk youth and “only” achieve recidivism results on par with IDJJ, 29 times more money is still available to invest in youth and community development programs and other public safety budget priorities that *do* reduce recidivism.**<sup>40</sup>

With fiscal discipline and close attention to ensure cost savings truly **are reinvested** into important community resources, including strong education, health, and family supports, there is still a net *general* safety benefit to avoiding incarceration for high-risk youth, even if the *specific* recidivism results are held constant.

Third, for the very few programs that could require high direct per capita costs closer to those of youth prisons, the ten-to-one ripple effect of incarceration’s broader economic drag still makes services delivered outside of harmful prison settings more cost-effective overall. For instance, for a very small number of youth who cannot yet be safely supervised outside of a residential setting, services could be delivered individually, by highly-trained employees, in a very personalized and local intensive therapeutic program with a homelike environment. **Even if upfront costs for tailored, extremely high-quality residential services matched youth prison costs, they would still be a more cost-effective alternative, due to avoiding some of the economic harms of incarceration.**

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The practice of committing youth to large institutions that fail to provide for their developmental needs is both costly in financial terms and ineffective in furthering the goal of crime prevention.<sup>41</sup>

– National Academy of Sciences

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**Community settings allow youth in poverty to earn money now and in the future.**

Community-based care models allow youth to work at paying jobs, an important part of avoiding delinquent behavior for many. Researchers focused on connecting youth to jobs identify the need for a continuum of work experiences, including community service, paid internships, summer and part-time jobs and apprenticeships. All are associated with increased likelihood of working later on in life.<sup>42</sup> When young people are at home, they can connect to work opportunities that can help them to transition to adulthood, connect to positive peers, and contribute to building their communities. Access to both work and civic engagement are key elements of a community-based approach for youth with complex needs.<sup>43</sup>

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Along with schooling and having relationships with caring adults, having a job can serve as a critical protective factor that helps young people leave delinquency behind them, and can help improve the safety of the whole community.<sup>44</sup>

– Washington D.C. Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services

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**Strong communities are key to success.**

High rates of youth delinquency, incarceration, and victimization are indicators that youth and families are not being adequately supported. Over the same period that Illinois budgeted \$2 billion in direct and indirect youth incarceration costs, the state’s human services funding – including support for afterschool programs, homeless youth services, and community-based mental health services – faced several rounds of significant cuts.<sup>45</sup> Illinois legislators and other stakeholders should consider delinquency to be a clear sign that more investment is needed in a specific neighborhood or region, to help bring it up to grade and promote positive youth outcomes. Youth around the state need the support of strong families and sustainable communities.

## Conclusion

Youth incarceration is the costliest response to delinquency – in upfront costs, hidden costs, youth outcomes, and societal costs. Even for high-risk youth, the costs of the choice to imprison outstrip other, less damaging approaches. When immediate safety concerns necessitate some form of secure care, more local and home-like settings are more efficient and less damaging, leaving more resources available for individual programs and treatment. Illinois should properly fund human services and community resources, expand alternatives to incarceration, and transition youth committed to IDJJ custody into settings that achieve better outcomes with fewer negative side effects than the incapacitation-driven youth prison model.

## Acknowledgements

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- ❖ Elizabeth Clarke, President, Juvenile Justice Initiative
- ❖ Annazette Collins, lobbyist; former Illinois State Senator
- ❖ Julie Hamos, Principal, Health Management Associates; former Illinois State Representative
- ❖ Candice Jones, President and CEO, Public Welfare Foundation; former Director, Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (IDJJ)
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- ❖ Billie Paige, Principal, Shea, Paige & Rogal, Inc.
- ❖ Adam Schwartz, Senior Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation; former Staff Attorney, ACLU of Illinois

- ❖ George Timberlake, Chair, Illinois Juvenile Justice Commission; retired judge
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This issue was considerably enhanced by previous assessments of the costs of youth and adult incarceration, in Illinois and nationwide, including work by Leslie Helmcamp, Jason Ziedenberg, Voices for Illinois Children, Justice Policy Institute, Vera Institute of Justice, and the Institute for Advancing Justice Research and Innovation at Washington University in St. Louis.

Data and historical research was conducted by clinic students Steven Cantor, Caroline Hammer, Jessica Kagansky, and Matthew Monahan. In addition to conducting a written survey (summarized in December 2017), Arielle Tolman conducted interviews with 14 key stakeholder informants to provide context; some quotations used in this series were edited for clarity, but all were confirmed prior to publication.

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<sup>1</sup> Delen Goldberg, *Auburn Residential Center has 22 beds, 25 staff members, \$1.8 million budget, 2 residents (and the story is similar at juvenile detention centers across the state)*, SYRACUSE POST-STANDARD (March 9, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> Of IDJJ's budgeted \$120M, \$79.8M is devoted to facility operation and maintenance; the balance is devoted to aftercare release supervision (\$21.3M); education (\$11.5M); mental health treatment (\$5.4M); and substance abuse programs (\$2M). OFFICE OF GOVERNOR BRUCE RAUNER, ILLINOIS STATE BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2019 (February 14, 2018) at 270-73 (hereinafter ILLINOIS BUDGET BOOK FY19). IDJJ average daily population is currently (November 2017) about 425 youth. Budgeted amounts do not include costs attributable to prison operations that are contained in the budgets of other state agencies. See *infra* note 6. Per capita annual costs were calculated using average daily in-facility population of 425 youth.

<sup>3</sup> ILLINOIS BUDGET BOOK FY19, *supra* note 2 at 270-73.

<sup>4</sup> Amanda Petteruti, Marc Schindler, and Jason Ziedenberg, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, STICKER SHOCK: CALCULATING THE FULL PRICE TAG FOR YOUTH INCARCERATION 11 (2014) (hereinafter JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE STICKER SHOCK). National average was calculated at \$407/day with a range of \$128-\$966/day. Calculations were based on different methodology and may not be directly comparable to each other. *Id.* at 43-48, fn 20-65 (note that Illinois' reported cost, \$304, was based on figures available in August 2014, when the incarcerated youth population was significantly higher, the youth prison at Kewanee remained open, and prior to certain litigation-driven spending. It may also include different components than the direct prison operational costs discussed here).

<sup>5</sup> Illinois is also not alone in feeling the increasing strain youth incarceration places upon state budgets. Particularly following the 2008 recession, rising costs and reduced budgets required many states to choose between funding youth prisons or other key state programs. "[T]he high costs of incarceration-based policies adopted in the 1990s have become increasingly clear, with escalating juvenile justice expenditures straining state budgets across the country. These costs became more onerous with the economic recession in 2008, forcing difficult trade-offs between corrections and other government programs. Moreover, states increasingly had good reason to question the social value of the costly reforms and to ask whether resources could not be better expended elsewhere." NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 42 (Richard J. Bonnie, *et al.*, eds.) (2013) (internal citations omitted).

<sup>6</sup> Christian Henrichson and Ruth Delaney, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS, (2012) (hereinafter VERA INSTITUTE PRICE OF PRISONS), available at: <http://www.vera.org/pubs/special/price-prisons-what-incarceration-coststaxpayers>. Many corrections costs – 30% of all spending related to adult corrections (the equivalent to a 43% indirect cost surcharge on top of IDOC budget appropriations) is housed in the budgets of non-corrections state agencies in Illinois (*e.g.*, the Department of Central Management Services, which handles employee health care and pensions). The proportion of corrections-related costs falling outside of the IDJJ budget is likely even higher than adult correction agency costs, due to additional shared services agreements with IDOC (*e.g.*, use of training facilities, information technology infrastructure, etc.).

<sup>7</sup> Stephanie Kollmann and Arielle Tolman, *Restoring the State Legacy of Rehabilitation and Reform*, CHILDREN AND FAMILY JUSTICE CENTER, COMMUNITY SAFETY & THE FUTURE OF ILLINOIS' YOUTH PRISONS Vol. 1 (January 2018).

<sup>8</sup> "As a result of the consent decree, IDJJ's costs for overtime and compensatory time have increased 66 percent – to \$4.9 million in 2015 from \$2.9 million in 2012 as facilities have worked to improve conditions for youth." Leslie Helmcamp, VOICES FOR ILLINOIS CHILDREN, INVEST IN YOUTH, NOT PRISONS 4 (2016) (at inset, "Harsh and Dangerous Conditions at Youth Prisons Come at a High Cost").

<sup>9</sup> Youth on IDOC parole status were previously responsible for obtaining and funding ordered treatment; most often youth simply received no community-based mental health or substance abuse therapies. See ILLINOIS JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION, YOUTH REENTRY IMPROVEMENT REPORT 29 (2011), available at: <http://ijjc.illinois.gov/reentryimprovementreport>. "Juvenile parolees are expected to independently find and finance mandated treatment and programming." *Id.*

<sup>10</sup> FY17-19 figures, ILLINOIS BUDGET BOOK FY19, *supra* note 2 at 270-73; FY16 figures, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 2016 at 11-12, available at: <https://www.illinois.gov/idjj/Documents/IDJJ%202016%20Annual%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf>; FY2007-2015 figures, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 2015 at 5, available at: <https://www.illinois.gov/idjj/documents/idjj%20annual%20report%202015.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup> Based on most recent online monthly report, reflecting 535 security staff and 44 teachers. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE MONTHLY REPORT 3, 6 (November, 2017), available at: <https://www2.illinois.gov/idjj/SiteAssets/Pages/Data-and-Reports/Public%20Monthly%20Report%20-%20November%202017.pdf>. While additional teachers were budgeted, they were not available to youth in prison due to unfilled positions. The constant gap between budgeted vs. provided services (educational and otherwise) is directly attributable to the ways in which the incarceration setting increases turnover, hinders prison hiring, and obstructs youth access to community-based services.



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<sup>12</sup> ILLINOIS BUDGET BOOK FY19, *supra* note 2 at 271.

<sup>13</sup> Karen Pierog and Dave McKinney, *Illinois Lawmakers Override Vetoes to Enact First Budget in Two Years*, REUTERS (July 6, 2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-illinois-budget/illinois-lawmakers-override-vetoes-to-enact-first-budget-in-two-years-idUSKBN19R32P>

<sup>14</sup> “The Homeless Youth program is a program that aims to promote the safety of Illinois’ youth by ensuring that their basic survival needs are met while also providing safe and stable housing; education and employment services, and the life skills necessary to become self-sufficient. . . . 59 percent of Homeless Youth providers (17 of 29) reported 2,530 homeless youth were turned away or put on a waiting list during the year. Sixty-five percent of those youth were seeking Transitional Living services.” CHICAGO FOUNDATION FOR WOMEN, *DAMAGE DONE: THE IMPACT OF THE ILLINOIS BUDGET STALEMATE ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN* (July 2017).

<sup>15</sup> Patrick Smith, *For Some Illinois Kids, Budget Battle Means Going to Prison Instead of Home*, WBEZ CHICAGO (December 22, 2015), available at: <https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/for-some-illinois-kids-budget-battle-means-going-to-prison-instead-of-home/57ca92fb-9f81-4d4a-8bbf-1bf48e59fffd>.

<sup>16</sup> “Lights in the facility parking lot had been off for months in December because [the youth prison at] Warrenville had been unable to pay the [electric] bill. The facility went through three food vendors in the 2016 fiscal year and had ongoing trouble finding a vendor who could provide fresh fruit and produce to the facility. Administrators reported that other essential services were threatened to be suspended and terminated including trash removal. Extremely old vehicles or those with 150,000 or more miles on them cannot be replaced. Facility roofs need to be fixed and administrators were ‘praying’ they would last through the winter. Administrators acknowledged that heating the facility was an issue and a generator was insufficient and failing. Some youth complained, and JHA visitors during the December 2016 visit experienced, that housing units were uncomfortably cold.” JOHN HOWARD ASSOCIATION OF ILLINOIS, *2016 MONITORING VISITS TO IYC-WARRENVILLE* at 5, available at: <http://www.thejha.org/sites/default/files/2016%20Warrenville%20Report.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> Youth prisons also impact the economy of the communities in which they are situated, both positively (*e.g.*, payroll) and negatively (*e.g.*, real estate excluded from property tax base). Economic impact analyses of the three most recently-closed IDJJ prisons estimated that each youth prison job supported an additional 0.09-0.5 non-prison jobs in the surrounding community area. See reports concerning IYC-Murphysboro, IYC-Joliet, and IYC-Kewanee, ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT FORECASTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY (cgfa.ilga.gov). Discussion of the total economic burden of youth incarceration in this section is not intended to substitute for a full cost-benefit analysis of state investment in youth prisons as opposed to other types of local economic development initiatives. Rather, it is to illuminate economic impacts to youth home communities that are routinely sidelined during state fiscal analyses related to facilities closures.

<sup>18</sup> “Areas with the most rapidly rising rates of incarceration are areas in which youths, particularly African-American youths, have had the worst earnings and employment experience.” Richard B. Freeman and William M. Rodgers III, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, *AREA ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES OF YOUNG MEN IN THE 1990S EXPANSION* (1999).

<sup>19</sup> JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE *STICKER SHOCK*, *supra* note 4 at 3.

<sup>20</sup> See generally Michael McLaughlin, INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS WORKING PAPER A.J1072016, *THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF INCARCERATION IN THE US (2016)* (hereinafter *WUSTL ECONOMIC BURDEN OF INCARCERATION*), available at: <https://advancingjustice.wustl.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/The%20Economic%20Burden%20of%20Incarceration%20in%20the%20US.pdf>.

<sup>21</sup> *Id.* at 8-19. For a discussion of the increase of mental health impacts in high-incarceration neighborhoods, see also Mark L. Hatzenbuehler, *et al.*, *The Collateral Damage of Mass Incarceration: Risk of Psychiatric Morbidity Among Nonincarcerated Residents of High-Incarceration Neighborhoods*, 105 AM. JOUR. PUB. HEALTH 138 (2015).

<sup>22</sup> *WUSTL ECONOMIC BURDEN OF INCARCERATION*, *supra* note 20 at 21.

<sup>23</sup> [T]he experience of imprisonment is more aversive for adolescents than for adult prisoners, because adolescents are in a formative developmental stage in which their social context is likely to shape the trajectory of their future lives. While some may view this experience as one that is deserved due to the harm caused to any victim of crime, it does not accomplish the purpose that most victims desire for a juvenile offender, *i.e.*, that the result of incarceration will be no future victims. Moreover, a juvenile or criminal record may severely limit employment prospects and educational opportunities, as well as hamper the ability to develop relationships with noncriminal affiliates. The harmful effects of the prison experience and of a criminal record are likely to have a lasting negative effect on psychosocial development and on the transition to a noncriminal adult life – making it extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve.” NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, *supra* note 5 at 135.

<sup>24</sup> Mark Cohen and Alex Piquero, *New Evidence on the Monetary Value of Saving a High Risk Youth*, 2 JOURNAL OF QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 25 (2009).

<sup>25</sup> Researchers from Columbia University commissioned by the White House Council for Community Solutions looked at the long-term costs to the public when young people aged 16-24 were disconnected from school, work, and experience the justice system (including confinement, and out-of-home placement). The researchers found that when the full cost of these experiences are tallied for the 6.7 million young people who lose the opportunity to earn as much money, pay taxes, and use social welfare resources more than others, it can cost the public \$4.7 trillion in lost economic potential in the long-term. Clive R. Belfield, *et al.*, CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE AND THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY SOLUTIONS, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF OPPORTUNITY YOUTH (2012), available at: <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED528650.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> “Youth aged 14-24 who spent some time incarcerated in a youth facility experienced three weeks less work a year (for African-American youth, five weeks less work a year) as compared to youth who had no history of incarceration.” Bruce Western and Katherine Beckett (1999), *How Unregulated Is the U.S. Labor Market?: The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution*, 104 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 1030 (1999). A study of 531 youth in Oregon’s juvenile correction system found that fewer than 30% secured employment during the year after they were released. Michael Bullis and Paul Yovanoff, *Idle Hands: Community Employment Experiences of Formerly Incarcerated Youth*, 14 J. EMOTIONAL BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 71, 77 (2006).

<sup>27</sup> See generally Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, *The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self Reports*, 94 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 155 (2004) (quantifying the common-sense idea that more education leads to better wages, which in turn reduces the incentive to engage in crime and other destructive activities).

<sup>28</sup> See, e.g., Ian Lambie & Isabel Randell, *The Impact of Incarceration on Juvenile Offenders*, 33 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 455 (2013); Barry Holman and Jason Ziedenberg, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 9 (2006).

<sup>29</sup> For 70/30 split of direct/indirect state budget costs, see generally VERA INSTITUTE PRICE OF PRISONS, *supra* note 6. For 1:10 ratio of hidden social costs, see generally WUSTL ECONOMIC BURDEN OF INCARCERATION, *supra* note 20.

<sup>30</sup> See ILLINOIS JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION, BURDENED FOR LIFE: THE MYTH OF JUVENILE RECORD CONFIDENTIALITY AND EXPUNGEMENT IN ILLINOIS, 32-42 (2016), available at: <http://ijjc.illinois.gov/publications/burdened-life-myth-juvenile-record-confidentiality-and-expungement-illinois> (describing how in Illinois employers frequently gain access, legally and illegally, to juvenile court records). Certain types of harmful record-sharing is expected to be reduced by key legislation arising out of the report’s findings (Illinois Public Act 100-285, eff. January 1, 2018). However, some hallmarks of incarceration — such as the name of the school district from which youth receive a diploma — will remain.

<sup>31</sup> While not all of IDJJ’s \$120M budget is spent on prison operations, the Vera Institute has previously estimated Illinois’ adult corrections-related costs, embedded in the budgets of other departments, to add as much as 43% to departmental costs, so this is still a conservative estimate. VERA INSTITUTE PRICE OF PRISONS, *supra* note 6. This estimate of economic burden to Illinois is also proportionate to a national youth incarceration cost estimate of up to \$21 billion annually. JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE STICKER SHOCK, *supra* note 4 at 3.

<sup>32</sup> NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, BRINGING YOUTH HOME: A NATIONAL MOVEMENT TO INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY, REHABILITATE YOUTH AND SAVE MONEY (2011); Antoinette Davis, *et al.*, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, *Using Bills and Budgets to Further Reduce Youth Incarceration* (2014).

<sup>33</sup> Ohio’s Reasonable and Equitable Community and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of Minors (RECLAIM) encourages juvenile courts to develop or purchase community-based options to meet the needs of youth who might otherwise be incarcerated. Since RECLAIM’s establishment in the early 1990s, Ohio reduced the number of state-run juvenile facilities from 11 to 3, and went from having over 3,000 youth incarcerated by the state to less than 500 in 2013. Gabrielle Celeste, SCHUBERT CENTER FOR CHILD STUDIES, GETTING IT RIGHT: REALIGNING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS IN OHIO TO REINVEST IN WHAT WORKS (2015).

<sup>34</sup> New York State gives counties 26% more funding for locally run alternatives to placement than it pays if a young person is confined, incentivizing more youth to be served at home. By 2014, counties were diverting \$2.5 million from confinement to the development of community-based services, and the number of young people confined in state-run facilities declined from over 2,000 to about 500. See Tim Roche, DETENTION REFORM IN NEW YORK STATES: STSJP AND ITS ALIGNMENT WITH JDAI. Powerpoint Presentation. *JDAI Inter-site Conference*, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2014). See also NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, *Supervision and Treatment Services for Juveniles Program (STSJP)*, [http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/jj\\_reform/default.asp](http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/jj_reform/default.asp) (accessed March 2018).

<sup>35</sup> Since 2005, Texas reduced population in the state’s secure facilities by more than 70 percent, closing more than nine state-run secure facilities. Deborah Fowler, FIRST FOCUS, A TRUE TEXAS MIRACLE: ACHIEVING JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN A TOUGH ECONOMIC CLIMATE (2012).

<sup>36</sup> Stephanie Kollmann, *Parents as Partners: Family Connection and Youth Incarceration*, CHILDREN AND FAMILY JUSTICE CENTER, COMMUNITY SAFETY & THE FUTURE OF ILLINOIS’ YOUTH PRISONS Vol. 2 (February 2018).

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<sup>37</sup> Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Ph.D., and Edward J. Latessa, Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, EVALUATION OF OHIO'S RECLAIM FUNDED PROGRAMS, COMMUNITY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, AND DYS FACILITIES (2005).

<sup>38</sup> *Id.*

<sup>39</sup> Incarceration in youth prisons costs approximately 29 times as much per capita as Redeploy Illinois. Helmcamp, INVEST IN YOUTH, NOT PRISONS, *supra* note 8 at 3 (at inset, "Harsh and Dangerous Conditions at Youth Prisons Come at a High Cost"). The population of youth currently diverted through Redeploy services may not be directly comparable to youth who are committed to IDJJ but there is considerable overlap as Redeploy-funded services, intended to be focused on youth who would otherwise be incarcerated, are still not available in many parts of the state.

<sup>40</sup> JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE STICKER SHOCK, *supra* note 4 at 3.

<sup>41</sup> NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, *supra* note 5 at 126.

<sup>42</sup> "Early job experience increases the likelihood of more work in the future, as well as more employer-sponsored education. A continuum of work experiences from the teen years onward - including volunteer and community service, summer and part-time jobs, work-study experiences, internships and apprenticeships - build job- readiness skills, knowledge and confidence. Despite the lack of jobs in the private sector, youth participating in school or other public systems - including foster care and juvenile justice - should be provided with subsidized work and/or work-like activities such as community service. Providers running youth programs should also be encouraged to hire young people." ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, YOUTH AND WORK: RESTORING TEEN AND YOUNG ADULT CONNECTIONS TO OPPORTUNITY 8 (2012).

<sup>43</sup> *Id.*

<sup>44</sup> D.C. DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH REHABILITATION SERVICES, GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ISSUE BRIEF: JUVENILE JUSTICE AND JOBS (2010).

<sup>45</sup> *See, e.g.*, CHICAGO FOUNDATION FOR WOMEN, DAMAGE DONE: THE IMPACT OF THE ILLINOIS BUDGET STALEMATE ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN (2017); Annie McGowan, ILLINOIS PARTNERS FOR HUMAN SERVICE, FAILING TO KEEP PACE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINING VALUE OF ILLINOIS HUMAN SERVICES REIMBURSEMENT RATES (2016); CENTER FOR TAX AND BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, ILLINOIS GENERAL FUND SPENDING IN FY2016: HOW ELECTED OFFICIALS CUT BILLIONS IN CORE SERVICE EXPENDITURES WHILE WORSENING THE DEFICIT—ALL WITHOUT CASTING A VOTE (2016); SOCIAL IMPACT RESEARCH CENTER AT HEARTLAND ALLIANCE, NEED FOR HUMAN SERVICES IN ILLINOIS (2011); Charles Whitaker, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO SCHOOL OF SOCIAL ADMINISTRATION, *Less Money, More Problems*, 17 SSA MAGAZINE 23 (2010).